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Ethical duties of nephrologists: when patients are 
nonadherent to treatment 
 
Jordan A. Parsons, Dominic M. Taylor, Fergus J. Caskey & Jonathan Ives 
 
Abstract 
When providing care, nephrologists are subject to various ethical duties. 
Beyond the Hippocratic notion of doing no harm to their patients, nephrologists 
also have duties to respect their patients’ autonomy and dignity, to meet their 
patients’ care goals in the least invasive way, to act impartially, and, ultimately, 
to do what is (clinically) beneficial for their patients. Juggling these often-
conflicting duties can be challenging at the best of times but can prove 
especially difficult when patients are not fully adherent to treatment. When a 
patient’s nonadherence begins to cause harm to themselves and/or others, it may 
be questioned whether discontinuation of care is appropriate. We discuss how 
nephrologists can meet their ethical duties when faced with nonadherence in 
patients undergoing haemodialysis, including: episodic extreme agitation, poor 
renal diet, missed haemodialysis sessions, and emergency presentations brought 
on by nonadherence. Further, we consider the impact of cognitive impairment 
and provider-family conflict when making care decisions in a nonadherence 
context, as well as how the COVID-19 pandemic might affect responses to 
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nonadherence. Suggestions are provided for ethically informed responses, 
prioritising a patient narrative approach that is attentive to patients' values and 
preferences, multi-disciplinarity, and the use of behavioural contracts and/or 
technology where appropriate. 
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Introduction 
A nephrologist’s duty of care to patients is rooted in the Hippocratic tradition, 
requiring them to have their patient’s interests at heart and not to harm them. 
However, it is not always clear how to satisfy this duty in circumstances such 
as, for example, when a patient must choose between two treatments with 
limited evidence of comparative effectiveness, when a patient is nonadherent to 
their current treatment, or when a patient is cognitively impaired. In 
approaching such situations, it is important to recognise that the duty of care 
encompasses several distinct duties, which must be navigated and weighed 
when making complex care decisions. These include the widely familiar duty 
of nonmaleficence, but also duties such as respecting patient dignity and 
autonomy, and meeting care goals in the least restrictive way possible (see 
Table 1). These duties will inevitably conflict at times, but that does not 
undermine their value; complex situations call for complex solutions, and trade-
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offs may prove necessary. In this paper, we will consider these duties in relation 
to patients receiving dialysis who have persistent issues with adherence. 
Patients with kidney failure who begin dialysis therapy generally do so 
in their best interests. Whether by the informed consent of the patient or, in the 
case of those without decision-making capacity, a decision taken on their behalf, 
it is started because it is deemed appropriate and clinically beneficial for the 
patient. However, whilst many undergo regular therapy without issue, some opt 
not to fully engage with agreed treatment [1,2], which raises a series of ethical 
concerns [3]. This is in part because dialysis, perhaps more than many 
treatments for other chronic conditions, is intrusive and can prove hugely 
disruptive to a patient’s life, resulting in what Curtin and colleagues have 
described as the ‘compliance-independence tight rope’ (p. 53) [4]. That being 
said, reported levels of dialysis nonadherence will be affected by the fact that it 
is more visible than, for example, drug nonadherence. 
Causes of dialysis nonadherence are multifactorial [5], and it may 
manifest in various forms [6]. Some are harmful only to the patient in question, 
such as missed sessions/early departure, poor care of dialysis access, and 
nonadherence to an appropriate diet and/or medication. Others, however, affect 
clinical staff, other patients, and those accompanying patients to dialysis clinics. 
For example, late arrival, emergency treatment (made necessary because of 
prior nonadherence), and disruptive/abusive behaviour during sessions (such 
behaviour may not always be characterised as nonadherence, but we include it 
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as a milder form). Johnson and colleagues discuss acts of nonadherence as a 
four-point continuum: (1) the patient is only harming themselves, (2) the patient 
is harming themselves and inconveniencing others, (3) the patient is verbally 
abusing others, and (4) the patient is physically abusing others (p. 78) [7]. 
Whilst this continuum may be taken as representing escalating seriousness, it is 
better understood as describing forms of nonadherence as each could be more 
or less serious depending on precise circumstances. When making decisions in 
light of nonadherence, then, there are considerations beyond the impact on the 
patient in question, and the appropriate response will vary depending on both 
where along the continuum the patient’s nonadherence falls and its seriousness. 
When faced with a patient with adherence issues, it is understandable 
that the nephrologist will feel frustration. From their perspective, they are trying 
to help the patient and may struggle to comprehend why the patient is not being 
receptive. However, this frustration causes its own problems. As noted by 
Balint, nonadherent patients are ‘often labelled as hateful, difficult, or 
uncooperative and then treated accordingly’ (p. 28) [8]. It is the nature of that 
“accordingly” that we will explore in this paper, considering the appropriate 
response when a patient is nonadherent with dialysis. Of note, our focus is on 
patients receiving in-centre haemodialysis (HD). Whilst patients on peritoneal 
dialysis may also be nonadherent by, for example, missing exchanges [9], 
different ethical issues arise because such patients undergo treatment at home.i 
 
i This applies also to patients undergoing at-home HD. 
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Further, we acknowledge that we are approaching this from the perspective of 
a Western, high-income country with a publicly funded dialysis service. Some 
of our discussion will have universal significance, but we note that there will be 
further complications when patients are nonadherent in low- and middle-income 
countries [10], and in non-Western cultures many of the autonomy-focused 
approaches we discuss could be less relevant [11,12]. 
In this paper we will discuss the cases of two fictional patients: Ms A 
and Mr B. Ethically defensible responses to HD nonadherence will be discussed 




Table 1. Key ethical duties of nephrologists 
 
Ethical duty Nonadherence considerations 
 
Respect for autonomy: 
To respect the right of a competent 
patient to make informed, voluntary 
decisions about their own care in 




 Has the patient expressed a desire for 
dialysis? 
 Has the patient provided reasons for 
their nonadherence? 
 Does the patient have the capacity to 




To do no harm to a patient. This 
includes not providing care that the 




 Is the nature of the patient’s 
nonadherence harmful to them? 
 Are other patients potentially harmed 
by the patient’s nonadherence? 
 
Beneficence: 
To do what is beneficial for the patient, 
with a focus on maximising benefits 
whilst minimising harms. 
 
 
 Are there actions that can be taken to 
address the patient’s nonadherence 
that would be in the patient’s 
interests? 




Respect for dignity: 
To recognise when the provision of 
certain care (particularly when not 
delivered in private) might be 
undignified for the patient, and to 
avoid this where reasonably possible.  
 
 
 Do the measures taken to allow 
dialysis delivery (i.e. restraint) 
undermine the patient’s dignity? 





To provide the care that achieves care 
goals with the least infringement/in the 
least restrictive way. 
 
 
 Are there alternative methods of 
delivering dialysis that are less 
invasive? 
 Might the patient’s care goals be met 




To act impartially and avoid 
inequalities where possible, ensuring 
that resources are allocated justifiably. 
 
 
 Are significant resources needed to 
overcome the patient’s 
nonadherence? 
 Will other patients have to forego care 
if means of overcoming the patient’s 
nonadherence are pursued? 
 
 
Ms A (1): Fluctuating decision-making capacity, extreme agitation, 
and poor diet 
 
 
Box 1. Ms A 
 
 
Ms A, a 65-year-old woman with a history of craniopharyngoma resected in 
childhood develops progressive chronic kidney disease of uncertain cause and is 
found to have atrophic kidneys on imaging. She starts renal replacement therapy in 
the form of in-centre haemodialysis. 
 
Her previous brain surgery has led to other psychiatric problems including problems 
with impulse control and compulsive eating. The majority of the time she 
demonstrates capacity to make decisions about her treatment and is very clear she 
wishes to continue haemodialysis. However, her mental state deteriorates 
intermittently, and this leads to episodic extreme agitation on dialysis where she 
represents a risk to herself and others. During a typical episode she may remove 
dialysis needles without warning, demand specific foods and drinks, or throw food 
and hot drinks at staff members. In this situation, emergency help is given including 
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stopping the dialysis session to reduce the risk of harm. For some periods, she has 
been denied hot drinks in order to maintain staff safety, but this has led to increased 
agitation and likelihood of her pulling out dialysis needles. 
 
These behavioural problems lead to poor control of dietary factors on dialysis (high 
potassium intake, high phosphate intake) and suboptimal dialysis dosing (from 
reduced time on the machine).  There is also difficulty maintaining permanent 
dialysis access – her upper limb AV fistula is damaged irremediably when a needle 
is removed during an episode of agitation, and a repeat episode is felt to be very 
likely. Ms A also prefers being attached to the dialysis machine via a line because it 
means she can use both of her hands while on the machine. As such, no further fistula 
formation is planned, leaving her receiving dialysis via a central venous catheter, 
further reducing dialysis adequacy and increasing Ms A’s risk of infection. 
 
 
First, Ms A’s fluctuating decision-making capacity. Essentially, she is 
expressing two conflicting choices regarding her HD depending on her mental 
state at the time. When she is (cognitively) well, she is clear that she wants to 
continue HD, but can quickly become resistant during sessions. This raises the 
question of whether the capacitous choice of Ms A to receive HD is reason 
enough to disregard her clear objections during sessions. In seeking to respect 
Ms A’s autonomy, it may not be clear which of her expressed desires (be they 
verbally or physically manifested) is “most autonomous”. 
To determine the “most autonomous” preferences in such a situation, 
one can consider the idea of first- and second-order preferences presented by 
Dworkin [13]. Simply put, first-order preferences are unreflective, and second-
order preferences are reasoned. Applied to Ms A, her resistance to HD can 
reasonably be considered her first-order preference, whilst her usually 
expressed desire to continue her treatment is her second-order preference. Given 
that reason is widely considered a necessary element of autonomous action, we 
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can conclude that Ms A’s desire for dialysis is more autonomous than her 
occasional – apparently impulse driven - resistance.ii However, the question 
remains of how to respond, because restraint – which is perhaps the most 
obvious and prima facie simplest way to respect Ms A’s second-order 
preference for HD – may not be considered proportional. 
Whereas all reasonable efforts should be made before considering 
restraint – including the use of a sitter during her HD sessions – with Ms A it 
might be felt that there are four options:iii 
 
(1) Her autonomous choice to undergo HD is respected, meaning her 
objections to care during sessions are ignored. Physical and/or chemical 
restraint will be used to provide care if necessary. 
(2) Her autonomous choice to undergo HD is respected, meaning her 
objections to care during sessions are ignored. At the same time, her 
capacitious request to undertake physical and/or chemical restraint to 
provide care if necessary is respected. 
(3) Her autonomous choice to undergo HD is respected, meaning her 
objections to care during sessions are ignored. However, it is agreed that 
 
ii One might present this as dichotomous, with a desire either being autonomous or not. 
However, we treat Ms A’s autonomy as a spectrum to not disregard the importance of her 
occasional resistance to treatment. 
iii An earlier iteration of these options is contained in a blog post by one of the authors. See 
Parsons JA. Ethical issues in restraining patients for dialysis. Available: 
https://openjusticecourtofprotection.org/2020/10/21/ethical-issues-in-restraining-patients-for-
dialysis/ [accessed 8 Dec 2020]. 
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the decision will be revisited if physical and/or chemical restraint 
becomes necessary to provide care. 
(4) Her autonomous choice to undergo HD is respected only when it is 
expressed, meaning that when she resists HD it will not be provided. 
 
In respecting Ms A’s autonomy, option (4) appears inappropriate as it fails to 
fully respect her “most autonomous” preference. In choosing between the 
remaining options, a narrative ethics approach is useful, seeking to understand 
Ms A’s values and preferences as they relate to her treatment. The nephrologist 
should, through discussion, seek to establish the reasons for her nonadherence 
and her care goals, and her feelings about restraint. Even though her agitation is 
linked to her psychiatric problems, it may be that small (or significant) 
adjustments to her environment will reduce the frequency or severity of these 
episodes. For example, it may be feasible for her to be dialyzed alone in a side 
room or have her dialysis rescheduled for a quieter shift/unit. Further, for 
effective shared decision making it is important that all options – including 
discontinuing HD and being managed palliatively – are properly discussed with 
Ms A to ensure respect for her autonomy [14]. The challenge of restraint for 
treatment (and, indeed, other elements of her nonadherence) would be avoided 
if, through effective dialogue, Ms A decides that discontinuing HD and being 
managed palliatively better meets her care goals – but she must in no way be 
pressured into making this choice just because the clinical team are reluctant to 




Should such changes not prevent Ms A’s agitation, but it is established 
(which seems likely) that her care goals clearly indicate continued outpatient 
HD, it may be feasible to establish a Ulysses pact with her. A Ulysses pact (also 
referred to in this context as an advance directive) entails an individual freely 
making a decision to later be bound by that decision, in anticipation of being 
unable to make autonomous choices; it can cover things a patient does want as 
well as things a patient does not want. This would enable the autonomy of Ms 
A to be respected by her agreeing to measures that enable her care goals to be 
met in line with her values and preferences – assuming, that is, that she consents 
to restraint when she has decision-making capacity and fully understands the 
impact of such restraint. In such a scenario, the duty of proportionality can be 
considered met. It would be important for an advance directive like this to 
describe the specific circumstances in which Ms A would want dialysis to cease 
if she loses capacity. One of the challenges of these kinds of advanced directives 
is ensuring that they cover the full range of possible eventualities, as they will 
tend to lose force outside of the specific circumstances described. It would also 
be important to revisit any Ulysses pact after each episode of restraint to confirm 
that it still aligns with Ms A’s values and preferences. 
This approach would be in keeping with patient-centred care and has 
been tacitly endorsed in a recent case in the England and Wales Court of 
Protection involving a similar situation regarding conflicting choices. In Re 
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AHK, a patient with a severe personality disorder similarly expressed a clear 
desire for HD when well, but frequently refused care at the time of delivery 
[15]. The Court refused the hospital’s application to provide HD only when the 
patient was adherent (option (4) above) and authorised both physical and 
chemical restraint to provide dialysis (option (1) or (2) above). Option (2) – 
whereby a Ulysses pact is established – is preferable to (1), because it better 
respects the patient’s autonomy. 
The conflicting preferences of Ms A are not the only concern. In 
deciding between these options, it is necessary to account for the nature of her 
occasional extreme agitation during HD sessions and the associated risks. This 
agitation is linked to her fluctuating decision-making capacity in that it arises 
only when her mental state intermittently deteriorates. Such actions present a 
risk of harm not only to Ms A, but to all those present, including staff, other 
patients, and any family and friends who may have accompanied patients. In 
addition to the potential physical harm from Ms A’s behaviour, other patients 
may find it highly distressing if they witness her being restrained to receive 
dialysis – particularly if it appears to them that such treatment is against Ms A’s 
will. 
Ms A’s nephrologist has a duty to her during these episodes, requiring 
that they act in her best interests. Assuming, for now, that her decision to 
continue with HD is taken as truly reflective of her values and preferences and 
her nephrologist is thus bound by it, it is clear that the continuation of HD even 
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in the face of her agitation is in both her medical and wider best interests. 
However, the risks to others must be considered; whilst not continuing to 
provide Ms A with care puts her life at risk, her nephrologist has the same duties 
of beneficence and nonmaleficence to all patients [8]. 
In situations when a patient’s nonadherence is potentially harmful to 
others, the ideal solution is to establish an effective behavioural contract. 
However, this does not seem appropriate to Ms A’s case as her extreme agitation 
is a result of her temporarily deteriorated mental state.iv Instead, Ms A’s dialysis 
schedule could be tailored to reduce agitation. For example, if she becomes most 
agitated in the final hour of her sessions then they could be shortened. If this is 
done, an additional weekly session could be scheduled to maintain her dose; this 
may be too burdensome for Ms A so may not be in her best interests, and a 
reduced dose for this reason is ethically defensible if appropriately balanced 
against the risks, such as higher mortality [16]. Tailoring Ms A’s HD schedule 
may also give her a sense of control over her treatment that results in greater 
adherence with other aspects of her care [17], meaning the apparently 
counterintuitive approach of reduced HD could result in better care overall. 
Indeed, and as O’Hare notes, ultimately, ‘[t]he person comes first’ (p. 486) and 
patients may consider things such as ability to travel more valuable; it is about 
how “adequacy” is understood [18]. 
A third consideration is Ms A’s poor diet. Notably, she has a diet that is 
 
iv We will revisit the role of behavioural contracts shortly. 
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not likely to result in her meeting target phosphate or potassium levels [19]. Her 
demands for particular foods during her HD sessions might be simply dealt with 
by refusing the requests. This can be justified not only on the basis of 
nonmaleficence because the foods requested might adversely affect Ms A’s 
condition, but also the fact that there is no wider duty on nephrologists to meet 
specific requests for food (even if requests were for a food that has no notable 
impact on patients receiving HD, nephrologists can justifiably refuse them). 
However, such an aggressive approach should be avoided as it damages the 
patient-provider relationship (which is especially important in chronic care). 
Further, it only affects Ms A’s diet during sessions; her diet at home may be 
high in potassium, so enabling (but not forcing) her to address the cause is 
important. 
Whilst she will have had conversations with her care team about it, Ms 
A may not fully understand the risks associated with a high-potassium diet for 
patients with kidney failure. It is ultimately her decision whether to maintain a 
problematic diet, but to satisfy the duty of beneficence her nephrologist should 
be confident that it is an informed decision. Further education or the 
involvement of a dietician may be appropriate. It is also important to consider 
external constraining factors, such as finances. It may be that Ms A cannot 
afford a renal diet [6], or it may be hard for her to access or prepare appropriate 
food – and she can perhaps be supported in this. If, after these efforts, Ms A 
continues her high-potassium diet, her nephrologist must respect her 
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autonomous choice to do so. Of course, if her diet was such that potassium 
levels were maintained at life-threatening levels even whilst receiving a 
significant dose of dialysis, this might result in a situation where continuing HD 
is essentially futile – but this is not the case. Her current situation may still result 
in occasional episodes of life-threateningly high potassium levels, but she could 
nonetheless live for many years with these high levels of potassium, albeit at 
increased risk. 
 
Ms A (2): Deteriorating condition and provider-family conflict 
 
 
Box 2. Ms A continued 
 
 
Dialysis continues for many years. After some discussion she agrees to have an 
arteriovenous graft formed in her thigh which is used successfully for dialysis. 
Unfortunately, when aged 70, she suffers a large stroke, causing significant physical 
disability as well as increasing episodes of distress. She is now regularly transferred 
to dialysis sessions on a stretcher, in an ambulance. She no longer demonstrates 
capacity to make decisions about ongoing dialysis treatment. Episodes of severe 
agitation during dialysis are now more common and increasing in frequency. 
Members of the dialysis nursing team report feeling uncomfortable providing 
dialysis for Ms A because of her apparent distress and risk of harm to herself and 
others. Most dialysis sessions are curtailed because of a risk of her removing needles, 
and the dialysis team are concerned that restraint may become necessary to allow 
safe dialysis to proceed. Her supervising nephrologist holds a family meeting to 
discuss the situation with Ms A’s family. The opinion of the clinical team is that 
dialysis is objectively causing distress and that this should be discontinued. Ms A’s 
family hold the view that her previously expressed opinion to continue dialysis 
remains relevant and wish for dialysis to continue even if restraint is required. 
 
 
Given the deterioration of Ms A’s condition, it is very possible that dialysis is 
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no longer in her best interests. It is important, however, that this is not assumed 
without due consideration, else there is potential for discrimination.  
From a distributive justice perspective, the provision of futile 
interventions entails costs which will affect the availability of care for other 
patients, so it is important that dialysis be provided only when clinically 
appropriate [20]. Furthermore, from a patient perspective, providing futile 
treatment that is invasive and distressing is unlikely to be beneficial. However, 
Ms A’s HD continues to serve its clinical purpose even if it does cause distress, 
so it cannot be considered futile.  
Given that continued HD cannot be considered futile, a patient in Ms 
A’s situation should be permitted to continue HD if, accounting for her own 
care goals, she feels the benefits outweigh the harms. However, now that Ms A 
has lost the capacity to make decisions about the continuation of her treatment, 
respecting her autonomy becomes more challenging as she, in effect, no longer 
has autonomy to respect. Such a change in her condition means that her 
previously expressed values and preferences may no longer be accurate and, 
whilst she may still be able to communicate care preferences, her lack of 
decision-making capacity means that these should not be unquestioningly 
followed. Here, the principles of beneficence and respect for dignity may come 
to the fore. Her having agreed to an arteriovenous graft being formed in her 
thigh further supports the case for her autonomous preference being for HD, but 
her deterioration may have caused a capacitous Ms A to choose to discontinue 




Different jurisdictions will require different responses when a patient 
lacks decision-making capacity. Whereas the decision would fall to the family 
in many countries, in others – such as England and Wales and Singapore – it 
would fall to the patient’s nephrologist in the absence of a formally appointed 
decision maker. Nonetheless, even if the decision does fall to the family, the 
patient’s nephrologist should advise the family on what they consider 
appropriate. Further, the decision maker should adopt a holistic view of what is 
in the patient’s best interests that accounts for their values and preferences rather 
than exclusively considering the patient’s medical best interests.  
Nephrologists may be hesitant to discontinue HD even if the patient’s 
behaviour is dangerous as such care may be viewed as a non-contingent 
entitlement [7]. As a life-sustaining therapy for those with a chronic condition, 
HD is viewed as a necessity in many countries. Nonetheless, HD is not always 
in the best interests of a patient [21]. There are many factors in Ms A’s case that 
may suggest HD discontinuation and palliative care to be more appropriate. In 
considering this, the nephrologist might look to the equivalence thesis. 
The equivalence thesis posits that, all things equal, there is no morally 
relevant distinction between withholding and withdrawing care [22]. Consider, 
then, a patient (Ms X) in a similar clinical and lifestyle condition to Ms A 
(having had a disabling stroke), but for whom HD has not yet started. Ms X has 
demonstrated similarly high levels of distress in other aspects of her care, such 
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as when having a phlebotomy. If it would not be considered clinically 
appropriate for Ms X to begin HD, the equivalence thesis would conclude that 
the continuation of Ms A’s HD is not clinically appropriate. Similarly, assuming 
that Ms A and Ms X are sufficiently similar in relevant ways, if it would not be 
considered in Ms X’s best interests to begin HD, then the equivalence thesis 
would hold it cannot be in Ms A’s best interests to continue with HD.  Ms A’s 
clinical team believe that the level of distress HD is causing her is now such that 
discontinuation is appropriate, as her HD is doing more harm than good. 
Assuming the clinical team would oppose the provision of HD to the relevantly 
similar Ms X, this is justifiable. However, it is important that Ms A’s clinical 
team are not motivated by a desire to discontinue her care because of her 
disruptive behaviour; it must be a decision made in Ms A’s best interests. 
Accounting for the possible harms of restraint in determining what is in 
Ms A’s best interests is required. It has the potential to hugely affect her 
psychologically; post-traumatic stress disorder is ordinarily a concern in HD 
patients [23] and may feasibly be exacerbated by physical restraint. This is 
especially important to consider when the patient is not able to consent to 
restraint themselves [24]. That is not to say that restraint cannot be justified, but 
it can only be justified in terms of the benefit to the patient; a patient’s best 
interests cannot be determined with reference to harm to others. As such, further 
attempts to reduce Ms A’s nonadherence with psychosocial approaches are 
appropriate at first, as well as again reconsidering the length and frequency of 
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her dialysis sessions. Restraint should always be reserved as a last resort, but 
this is especially important when a patient lacks decision-making capacity as it 
is to a greater degree inflicted on the patient rather than agreed upon. 
All these factors should be discussed with Ms A’s family regardless of 
the jurisdiction. No matter who ultimately holds decision-making authority, 
consensus is preferable because this is better for all involved. The family will 
generally provide an understanding of the patient’s values and preferences that 
the clinical team lacks, and even within the clinical team a range of perspectives 
is important as, for example, the way nephrologists and nurses interact with 
patients differs. 
Finally, there is the question of potential moral distress to members of 
the clinical team because of conflict between them and Ms A’s family. Moral 
distress is the experience of psychological distress caused by a moral event [25]. 
In Ms A’s case, that might result from a dialysis nurse having to continue to 
provide HD that they do not consider ethically appropriate because of external 
constraints (made worse by the experience of Ms A’s suffering and 
nonadherence). This is especially a concern in jurisdictions where the family 
are acting as decision maker, because of the lack of input the nurse may have in 
that decision. Whilst the potential for moral distress to clinical staff is not an 
ethically justified factor in a decision about patient care, it is important for the 
clinical team to understand and respond to it [26]. 




Mr B (1): Missed sessions and emergency presentation 
 
 
Box 3. Mr B 
 
 
Mr B, a 35-year-old man with a history of established kidney failure from childhood 
nephrotic syndrome related to focal segmental glomerulosclerosis (FSGS) receives 
in-centre haemodialysis. He had a kidney transplant in childhood with an episode of 
acute cellular rejection causing graft failure several weeks after the transplant 
surgery. Further transplantation has been precluded by poor adherence with 
treatment. He regularly uses illicit drugs, has a chaotic lifestyle, and is well known 
to the hospital security staff and police for relatively minor crimes committed on and 
off the hospital site. He expresses clearly and with capacity a decision to continue 
life-sustaining dialysis treatment but, at least weekly, is absent from scheduled 
dialysis sessions (prescribed thrice-weekly). Typically, in the 48 hours after missing 
a dialysis session, he will present to the emergency department with severe, life-
threatening hyperkalaemia, or pulmonary oedema and need emergency dialysis. On 
occasion, because of haemodynamic instability or requirements for ventilator 
support, this care is delivered on the intensive care unit. This pattern develops into a 
routine such that it is normal (over months and years) for him to miss at least one 
weekly dialysis session and attend instead as an emergency. This pattern of care use 
leads to regular loss of a routine dialysis slot, as well as regular use of an emergency 
dialysis slot, at the expense of other urgent inpatients requiring dialysis. The team 
make efforts to prevent this ongoing pattern through discussion with the patient (who 
maintains a wish to continue regular treatment but continues with the same pattern 
of behaviour) and through provision of an additional weekly dialysis slot to give 
more flexibility (leading to him missing two dialysis slots rather than one). 
 
 
A patient narrative approach is fitting in this scenario, with a focus on being 
non-judgemental and not blaming Mr B for his situation. Fiester writes that 
‘[h]ostility, anger, depression, anxiety, and even noncompliance are common 
reactions to difficult circumstances, even among the psychologically healthy 
and typically well-adjusted’ (p. 2) [27]. Whilst there is usually an element of 
choice to HD nonadherence, it is important to recognise the impact such 
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demanding care can have on a patient and how it can fracture the provider-
patient relationship. Patients who do not engage in care the way their 
nephrologists expect are often viewed in a condescending way [28], which can 
lead to patient anger [29]. The inherent vulnerability of patients does not 
necessarily absolve them from wrongdoing [30] but must be appreciated as 
potentially contributing to adherence issues. Recognising Mr B’s situation as 
requiring a shared decision rather than an intervention is not only more likely to 
yield lasting results but is more respectful of his autonomy [31], particularly 
given his apparently autonomous desire to continue HD. 
Understanding the reasons for Mr B’s behaviour will likely prove 
productive in helping to ascertain an appropriate way forward. Kahn notes that 
informally interviewing a patient can prove cathartic for the patient [32]. 
Similarly, affording Mr B an opportunity to share his story with the clinical 
team in a non-judgemental environment may improve the provider-patient 
relationship and instil trust. Ideally, this would include other teams involved in 
Mr B’s care – such as the intensive care team that occasional provides 
ventilatory support – as it is also important that they understand his values, 
preferences, and care goals. Where appropriate, involving a psychologist may 
also be beneficial [33]. Suggestions that this approach will result in 
‘transformed conduct on the part of the patient’ (p. 4) [27] seem exaggerated, 
but there is at least potential for some improvement. With conversation being 
minimally invasive (assuming any request by Mr B to end the conversation is 
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respected), this patient narrative approach as a first choice satisfies the duty of 
proportionality. 
In addressing underlying causes, the renal team could also make 
reasonable efforts to help Mr B in controlling his drug use – such as a referral 
to drug services – which may help in gaining his trust and cooperation [8]. A 
multi-disciplinary approach enables a high level of support [34] and may prove 
more successful in the long term – particularly for patients with long-term 
patterns of nonadherence – than efforts by only the renal team. Given that Mr 
B’s drug use may be affecting his ability to agree to and adhere to a revised care 
plan, addressing it may enhance his autonomy by improving his ability to make 
a reasoned and informed decision about his behaviour based on his values and 
preferences. Efforts to do so must, however, be conscious of Mr B’s 
vulnerability in the situation; he may feel judged for his drug use so the issue 
must be approached sensitively to respect his dignity. 
Another approach that may be suitable for Mr B is the use of mobile 
technologies to improve education and, in turn, adherence. A 2015 study found 
that a system of automated SMS texts and voice messages was effective in 
reducing the number of missed HD sessions [35]. Whilst this study included 
only a small number of patients, it at least demonstrates the potential of such 
methods. A recent review of patient-facing smartphone apps for chronic kidney 
disease also highlighted several with a focus on patient education [36], which 
itself may improve adherence. Using technology in this way may not only be 
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ethically defensible, but ethically required. The telemedical imperative holds 
that given the benefits of such technologies, healthcare systems have a duty to 
seriously consider their implementation provided they are safe, effective, 
acceptable to patients, and raise no other service-specific concerns [37]. 
Similarly, assuming Mr B consents to the use of such an approach, the negligible 
burden would also satisfy the duty of least infringement (proportionality). 
Patients such as Mr B may be considered too nonadherent to benefit, but if such 
simple interventions can be included as part of a behavioural contract then the 
possibility of them contributing to a reduction in nonadherence is justification 
enough for their use. 
Following these interventions, establishing a behavioural contract with 
Mr B should become more feasible. Not only does an effective behavioural 
contract prevent the need for potentially damaging conversations about either 
forced care or the discontinuation of care, but it maximises the patient’s 
autonomy in the situation; the patient is agreeing to a way forward rather than 
being instructed. As such, it may empower the patient [34]. Psychosocial 
interventions like this have been suggested as suitable early interventions to 
avoid escalation when the patient’s nonadherence is mild [7,38]. In establishing 
a behavioural contract, it should be noted that Mr B appears to have an 
expectation of treatment at his leisure, regardless of the impact on others. Whilst 
this could be viewed as an understandable expression of his anger [8], it is 
nonetheless ethically problematic. However, particularly in publicly funded 
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healthcare systems, patients themselves have a duty ‘not to use health services 
casually’ (p. 345) [30], the breaking of which becomes more problematic as the 
services in question get closer to acute medical services. It would be appropriate 
to remind Mr B of this duty as a reason why a behavioural contract is important. 
Beyond the harm Mr B’s behaviour poses to himself, there are other 
pertinent considerations. The additional HD sessions allocated to Mr B entail 
further costs. His non-attendance and subsequent presentation as an emergency 
mean that Mr B’s care is using more resources – especially relative to other HD 
patients. This will inevitably result in resource compromises elsewhere, raising 
legitimate questions around distributive justice. 
Various models exist for the allocation of scarce resources, including 
lotteries, prioritarianism, utilitarianism, and approaches based on reciprocity 
[39]. However, decisions based on distributive justice at the patient level are 
ethically problematic because they undermine both the integrity and trust central 
to the provider-patient relationship [40]. As such, these models are most 
appropriately applied at a broader (system or policy) level. This does not, 
however, preclude discussing with Mr B the impact of his behaviour on others, 
and reminding him that his actions waste precious resources. Intentionally and 
maliciously wasteful behaviour could legitimately be responded to with 
sanctions – such as refusing treatment. However, such sanctions should always 
be a last resort and given the vulnerable position of patients like Mr B would 
rarely be appropriate. 




Mr B (2): Continued nonadherence amidst the additional pressures 
of the COVID-19 pandemic 
 
 
Box 4. Mr B continued 
 
 
The situation continues as before, with a routine of ongoing missed regular dialysis 
sessions followed by emergency presentation with life-threatening hyperkalaemia. 
The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic ensues. This situation raises two further issues:  
 
i) Acute dialysis services are under intense pressure to be able to continue to 
provide dialysis while maintaining time-consuming infection control 
procedures during the pandemic. 
ii) Intensive care services are under current and anticipated extreme pressure to 
provide care to a large number of patients infected with the virus. Previously 
agreed and individualised criteria around the suitability for intensive care 
admission are changing in light of the reduced resource available. 
 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has raised many ethical issues in the provision of 
kidney care [41,42], and might result in the balance of benefits and harms being 
shifted in the context of HD patients with adherence issues. Mr B’s frequent, 
unscheduled arrivals at the hospital as an emergency now present the additional 
risk of COVID-19 infection and place avoidable pressure on services already 
close to breaking point. As such, Mr B’s actions may now be considered to have 
moved beyond being disruptive to the point of being dangerous. 
If the additional risks were only to Mr B, the fact that he has decision-
making capacity and has expressed his preferences clearly would require his 
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autonomy to be respected. Further efforts to educate him as to the risks would 
be appropriate in assisting him to make a fully autonomous (informed) decision, 
but it would ultimately be a matter of Mr B taking responsibility for his own 
health. However, the undue risks to others introduced by his actions invoke 
other ethical duties that must be balanced. 
Mill’s harm principle stipulates that ‘the only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others’ (p. 22) [43]. This principle centres on 
individual liberty, which can be taken as autonomy in the medical context. As 
such, it holds that a patient with no pertinent cognitive impairment is free to act 
in a way that is detrimental to their own health, but should their actions pose a 
risk to others it is justifiable to (proportionately) interfere with their ability to 
do so. In more familiar language, it becomes a question of autonomy (applied 
to Mr B) versus nonmaleficence (applied to the other people at the hospital). 
Understandably, Mill’s harm principle has been tacitly invoked throughout the 
COVID-19 pandemic. For example, requiring patients to wear face coverings 
in hospitals is to exercise power over them to prevent harm to others. But how 
might it apply to Mr B’s situation? 
First, it can be dismissed as justifying the discontinuation of Mr B’s HD 
(including the denial of emergency care). As noted above, the harm principle 
permits proportionate interference. Given that discontinuation of Mr B’s care 
would ultimately result in his death, it cannot be considered a proportionate 
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response to the risks of harm his behaviour creates. The nephrologist is 
ultimately seeking to continue Mr B’s care whilst preventing harm coming to 
others, and various measures might be tried to achieve both. 
Even if alternatives are exhausted, the discontinuation of Mr B’s HD is 
undermined unless the decision is also taken to refuse him emergency care when 
he needs it; if his HD were discontinued, his condition would inevitably 
deteriorate to the point that emergency care would be required to save his life. 
The refusal to provide emergency care would rarely be ethically justified 
because of the nephrologist’s role of ‘captive helper’ (p. 350) [30]. This 
difficulty is demonstrated by the 1982 case of Payton v Weaver in the US, in 
which the judge ruled that the patient’s failure to keep to an agreed package of 
care meant that the nephrologist no longer had a duty to provide chronic HD, 
but that emergency HD should still be provided if necessary [44]. This 
distinction is, in practice, irrelevant with care such as HD. Mr B’s chronic HD 
and emergency HD must be treated as one if discontinuation is considered, and 
such discontinuation would seldom be justifiable. 
Whilst harm to others does not justify the discontinuation of Mr B’s care, 
the question of distributive justice remains because Mr B’s emergency 
presentations require care that is in short supply. The same models outlined 
above may be considered, and they have been discussed as applicable to kidney 
care in the COVID-19 context elsewhere [41]. However, whilst the pressure on 
resources has increased, it remains that they should not be considered at the 
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patient level. They may introduce a risk of prejudice in the COVID-19 context 
as nephrologists may be increasingly frustrated with behaviour such as Mr B’s 
and be less inclined to divert resources to patients who are having a negative 
impact on service provision “by choice”. Instead, it makes sense to again 
consider the equivalence thesis in relation to Mr B’s scheduled HD, accounting 
for any wider changes to allocation systems. The fact that his emergency 
presentations sometimes also require respiratory support means that wider 
COVID-19 resource allocation guidelines will likely apply, and Mr B would 
inevitably be affected by those – but on an equal footing with everyone else. 
Finally, in continuing the patient-centred approach and seeking to 
enhance Mr B’s autonomy, before any decisions are made about his care it is 
important that Mr B is made aware of the change of circumstances and what 
this means for his care if his nonadherence continues. It should be made clear 
to Mr B that, given additional resource pressures, it may not be possible to 
dialyze him immediately should he continue to present as an emergency. 
Attempts might also be made to revisit behavioural contracts in light of the 
significant change in circumstances. 
 
Conclusion 
It is important to remember amidst all the rhetoric of the duties of nephrologists 
that patients too have duties. As argued by Draper and Sorell, ‘[a]utonomy 
without responsibility is not autonomy’ (p. 340) [30]. Patients need to recognise 
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that they are not free from obligations when they access care, and respecting 
those providing care, as well as other patients, is key among them. That being 
said, the duty of care owed by nephrologists generally wins out over patient 
accountability for wrongdoing in practice. 
Whilst there is undoubtedly a point at which a nephrologist’s duty to 
provide care for a particular patient is exhausted by that patient’s nonadherence, 
reaching that point should be rare. Before discontinuing a patient’s care, it is 
important to be absolutely sure that one has ‘left no stone unturned’ (p. 29) [8]. 
As such, when faced with any form of nonadherence the first response should 
be to attempt to ascertain the cause, address it, and prevent it escalating. 
Ultimately, it is important that all dialysis providers have clear policies 
on managing nonadherence patients that all staff are trained on [6] and that 
patients are educated about. This avoids the need for complex situations – such 
as those of Ms A and Mr B – to be navigated solely by the clinical team at the 
time. However, a 2000 study in the US found that only 51% of participants 
(healthcare professionals involved in kidney care) felt that they had received 
adequate training to deal with these complex situations, and 40% reported that 
their HD unit lacked a written policy [45]. Some providers may still lack 
appropriate policies and training. Local guidance should be developed in line 
with relevant laws and reflection on key ethical considerations. It should exist 
independent of any wider guidance on challenging behaviour from patients so 
that issues specific to HD nonadherence are addressed. 
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There are many approaches to improving HD adherence, which will 
have varying success depending on the patient and the nature of their 
nonadherence. Several key approaches have been discussed in relation to the 
cases of Ms A and Mr B, but we have not provided an exhaustive list. Further 
psychosocial interventions have been outlined by Krespi, including cognitive 
behavioural therapy and mindfulness meditation [38]. We provide 
recommendations for ethically informed approaches in Box 5. 
Some of the approaches to addressing nonadherence may result in a care 
plan that is, from a clinical perspective, less than ideal. However, the importance 
of patient-centred care must be recognised, and respecting patient values and 
preferences that reduce nonadherence may be overall preferable to a clinically 
ideal care plan accompanied by extreme distress and nonadherence. 
 
 
Box 5. Ethically informed recommendations for managing nonadherent 
patients 
 
 Take a patient narrative approach, seeking to understand the patient’s story and 
the reasons for their nonadherence. 
 Actively display compassion and avoid appearing judgemental, remaining aware 
that patients may feel judged for their actions. 
 Educate the patient as to the risks of nonadherence, including the implications 
of their nonadherence for others. 
 Establish behavioural contracts collaboratively with the patient that set clear 
limits for what will be tolerated. 
 Consider the use of technology (such as SMS notifications) to improve 
adherence. 
 Adopt a multi-disciplinary approach where appropriate, involving, for example, 
psychologists and social workers. 
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 Develop clear policies on responding to nonadherence (including when 
involuntary discontinuation might occur) and educate patients about them. 
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